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doi:10.1016/j.jtcvs.2006.03.044linical trials are the medical community’s diagnostic tests. When a physician
sends a patient for a conventional diagnostic test, he or she is asking whether
a certain disease is likely to be present. Similarly, when the medical
ommunity designs and executes a clinical trial, it wants to know whether a certain
reatment is likely to work. And just like a diagnostic test, a clinical trial has the
otential for yielding an incorrect, erroneous result.
The traditional approach to reporting probability of error in clinical trials in-
ludes P values and statements of power. The P value is the probability that a
ositive trial result is just the result of chance, given an assumed truth of the null
ypothesis, which is that the treatment does not work. Power refers to the ability of
trial to show that a treatment works, given that in truth it actually does. Although
resenting P values and statements of power has become lore in reporting clinical
rials, careful reflection shows that clinicians might not gain as much value from
hem as they might think.
When a clinician reads a diagnostic test report that is “positive,” the next question
s, “How likely is it that my patient has the disease?” That is, what is the likelihood
hat this positive report is in fact correct? As described by Bayesian theory, the
ikelihood of a correct result given a positive test result, or positive predictive value,
s related not only to the sensitivity and specificity of the test but also to the pretest
ikelihood of disease being present.1
Similarly, when a clinical trial report is presented to the medical community
uggesting that a treatment works, the critical question that clinicians should ask is,
Is the trial likely to be reporting a correct result?” What is the positive predictive
alue of the trial? To estimate this, we need to know not only the P value and the
ower but also something about the pretrial likelihood of a positive result, as
ecently argued by Ioannidis2 and O’brien and Castelloe.3
Bayesian thinking applied to clinical trials is shown schematically in Table 1
taken from Ioannides2), which shows an example of an experimental treatment in
hich the pretrial likelihood of success is considered to be low (ie, 10%). This might
e because we are testing a new and innovative treatment for which there is little
rior experience. We imagine a universe in which 1000 trials are performed, one of
hich happens to be the one reported in the journal resting between our hands. Each
rial is small and has a power of only 50% because funding is limited and single
enters have few eligible patients. Traditionally, a trial result would be considered
ositive if the P value is .05 or less. Given the pretrial expectation that 100 of 1000
rial results will be positive and given a power of 50%, one would expect 50 positive
rial results, which is shown in the upper left hand box of Table 1. Conversely,
mong the 900 predicted negative trial results supporting the null hypothesis, we
ould expect 45 positive trial results, given a P value of .05. Thus of 1000 trials in
his imaginary universe, we predict 95 positive trial results, of which 50 are
rue-positive results and 45 are false-positive results. The positive predictive value
or any of the positive trial results turns out to be only 52%.
Now let us put ourselves in the position of a clinician reading a positive trial
esult on this treatment in a medical journal. We might be concerned about low
ower, but the trial result was positive because the reported P value is .05, which
ounds impressive. However, when considering the low pretrial likelihood of a
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TSositive result, we must conclude that there is a 48% chance
hat this positive trial result is actually wrong!
Although this hypothetical example might seem far-
etched, in fact, most medical literature is plagued by prob-
ems with low pretest probability and underpowered sam-
les. As summarized by Ioannidis,2 much of what is
ublished in the medical literature might actually be false.
And the problem worsens.
A reported positive trial result might be incorrect not
nly because of a low pretrial likelihood but also because of
ias. Bias refers to a fundamental problem in the way the
rial is designed, analyzed, or reported that results in its
esult being reported as positive when in fact it is not. There
re many well-known sources of bias. As mentioned by
iruvoipati and colleagues,4 bias can result from a lack of
npredictable allocation, inadequate concealment of alloca-
ion from investigators, inadequate blinding, inadequate
ample size, and failure to use the intent-to-treat method for
nalyzing results.
Yet another problem arises from performing multiple
rials of the same treatment.2 Although it seems to be
cientifically intuitive that one wants to reproduce results,
igure 1. Hypothetical plot showing the probability of a positive
rial result reflecting truth (posttrial probability) according to
retrial probability and study power. A low  value of 0.1 (top-
ost curve) corresponds to 90% power, whereas a high  value
f 0.7 (bottom curve) corresponds to 30% power; intermediate
urves show a  value of 0.3 (70% power) and a  value of 0.5
50% power). Posttrial probability increases as pretrial probabil-
ABLE 1. Application of the Bayesian approach to clinica
Truth 
Trial  (null hypothesis rejected) (1  ) * 10
Trial  50
Total 100
ower  1    0.50.   0.05. Pretrial probability  0.10. Posttrial prty and power increase. t
50 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Auguerformance of multiple trials by multiple groups leads to
n increased risk of false-positive findings because of a
tandard, multiple testing problem.5,6 When one puts to-
ether low pretest likelihood, bias, and multiple trials, one is
eft with a high likelihood of false-positive trial results
Figures 1 and 2).
What can the medical community do to ensure that
linical trials that are reported in the medical literature are in
act believable? First, with rare exceptions, trials that are
ublished in high-impact journals and that are likely to
ffect clinical practice should be those in which there is a
easonably high pretrial probability of success. Exceptions
hould be explicitly categorized by labeling them, for ex-
mple, as “preliminary communications.”7 Trials should
ave high power and little bias. I therefore agree with
iruvoipati and colleague’s call4 for widespread adoption of
he CONSORT statement8 for reporting trials in cardiac
urgery.
ls
Truth  (null hypothesis) Total
50  * 900  45 95
855 905
900 1000
lity  0.52. Adapted from Ioannidis.2
igure 2. Hypothetical plot showing the probability of a positive
rial result reflecting truth (posttrial probability) according to
retrial probability and degree of bias. N is the number of trials
erformed, in this case 4. The  value is the P value for signifi-
ance, in this case .05. Also, in this case power is high at 90%.
ias is represented by , with values of 0 and 0.1 corresponding
o little bias (in design, analysis, and reporting) and 0.4 corre-
ponding to a substantial degree of bias (intermediate curve,  
.2). Note the dramatic decrease in posttrial probability as bias
ncreases and pretrial probability decreases. This type of sce-
ario might be common for small trials of highly innovativel tria
0 reatments.
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A
TSTiruvoipati and colleagues4 are to be congratulated for
heir systematic and critical evaluation of the cardiac sur-
ery literature and for their challenge to its journal editors.
outine incorporation of the CONSORT guidelines, as ex-
mplified by 5 recently published cardiac surgery trials,9-13
ill improve the transparency of reporting and decrease the
ikelihood of bias,14 thereby increasing the predictive value
f one of the medical community’s most precious diagnostic
ests, the randomized trial.
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